Intrusion
Detection Terminology
by Andy Cuff
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are still in their infancy, but in
terms of development the are evolving at an extraordinary rate. The
terminology associated with IDS is evolving just as rapidly. As a
result of IDS' rapid growth and the marketing prowess of some IDS
vendors, some confusion has arisen about the correct meaning of key
terms. In some cases the same term may be used by different vendors to
mean different things. This is the first of a two-part series that
discusses IDS terminology, including terms where there may be
disagreement from within the security community. Wherever possible, I
have tried to include all definitions except where I consider usage of
the term to be inaccurate or misleading.
Alerts (or Events)
An IDS alert is a warning issued by the
IDS to the system operator when it detects suspicious activity. The IDS
sends alerts either locally or to a remote console in a multitude of
ways. The bespoke GUI is considered the most common for full time
analysts who receive this either directly or via a database. I have
seen syslogs, event logs, flat files, email, pop-ups even mobile phone
text messages being used. The most impressive use of a phone I have
seen has to be the guy whose honeypot passed alert messages to his
mobile phone telling him everything the hackers inside his honeypot
were doing. This allowed him to cut the connection should they endanger
others on the Internet.
ArachNIDS (Advanced Reference Archive of
Current Heuristics for Network Intrusion Detection Systems)
Developed by Max Vision's White Hats, ArachNIDS is
an attack profile database used to dynamically create signatures which
are compatible with various Network IDS.
Automated/Active Response
As well as alerting to an attack, some IDS can automatically defend
against them. This is achieved in a variety of ways: first, by
reconfiguring routers and firewalls to reject future traffic from the
same address and, second, by crafting packets on the network to reset
the connection. There are problems with both methods. Attackers,
through spoofed source addresses, can convince the victim's IDS to
reconfigure their firewalls etc to block a friendly party. Resets could
fire on false positives, causing disruptions in normal traffic.
Attackers have been known to use the resets generated by their attack
to discover, through the packet's TTL, where in the network the IDS is
likely to reside, though some IDS vendors craft the reset with variable
TTLs. Other considerations are: do the resets go to both source and
destination or just destination, and where in the network is the packet
injected? Finally, what about UDP? Issues with automated response have
come to a head with the advent of Intrusion Prevention Systems that
rely on automated response for most of their protection. Realistically,
automated response could be used where the likelihood of a false
positive is minimal as with so much of the security arena it's a
question of being able to manage the risk.
Bandwidth
Bandwidth is the maximum amount of data that can
traverse a network segment. Bandwidth usage is a great tool to an IDS
analyst, as unexpected increases can give an early warning of a DDOS
attack or correlate a suspicious event. Quite often there are
legitimate reasons for such activity but the kudos gained by the
analyst for reporting such activity within the NOC is invaluable.
BlacklistMany organizations will build a
list of addresses from
various companies, ISPs and even countries that they consider to be a
threat. These will either be explicitly blocked or monitored closely. A
few sites on the Internet maintain lists of known offenders which can
be downloaded such as http://www.kgb.to/.
CIDF - Common Intrusion Detection Framework
The Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) is an effort to
standardize intrusion detection to some degree by developing "protocols
and application programming interfaces so that intrusion detection
research projects can share information and resources and so that
intrusion detection components can be reused in other systems."
CISL - Common Intrusion Specification Language
CISL is the
language used for CIDF components to communicate with each other. As
CIDF is an attempt to standardize protocols and interfaces, so CISL is
an attempt to standardize the language of intrusion detection research.
Content Monitoring
This is the ability to apply a security
policy to the body of a communication within network transmissions.
Collectively this refers to both URL filtering and e-mail filtering.
Unlike infrastructure elements, such as routers, firewalls and many
Intrusion Detection Systems that look at content independent of
context, a content security system must completely assemble the network
transmissions within the intended context before the content can be
analyzed.
Consoles
In order to make an IDS suitable for the corporate
environment, the dispersed IDS sensors need to report to a central
console. These days many central consoles will also accept data from
other sources, such as other vendor's IDSs, firewalls, routers, etc.
This information can be correlated to present a more complete attack
picture. Where the console accepts input from multiple sources each
product will report the same event in different ways. The central
security console will have its own taxonomy allowing events to be
analysed whilst only having to understand the central consoles event
reports. Recently products such as ISS SiteProtector and Tenable have
correlated events with vulnerability scanner information. The IDS
events are prioritized according to how susceptible the target hosts
are to the attack. The main drawback of a central console is the
limited depth of information presented to the analyst. In my experience
a good analyst will refer back to the original data source for some
events where the central console provides minimal information.
Correlation
This is the cross-relating of multiple data sources to gain a wider
understanding of an incident.
CVE - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
An age-old problem
with vulnerabilities is that when designing scans or countermeasures,
one vendor will call a vulnerability by one name and another vendor
will call it something completely different. Moreover, some vendors may
have multiple signatures for what could be a single CVE entry, possibly
giving the illusion of them producing a more effective product. MITRE
has gone to some lengths to address this with CVE, by standardizing
names for vulnerabilities and participating vendors then use this name.
For more information, please visit www.cve.mitre.org.
DeepSight Analyzer and DeepSight TMS (Threat
Management System)
DeepSight
Analyzer
is a free service offered by SecurityFocus/Symantec (SecurityFocus is
owned by Symantec) to which Internet-connected networks may pass their
network security events to
anonymously. Events are then correlated from different IDS and firewall
devices,
allowing users to monitor and trend their data. In turn, this data is
used
anonymously in DeepSight
TMS, Symantec's commercial offering, which provides early warning
of worms, in global Internet attack trends, and other attacks.
Desynchronization (see also Evasion)
Originally the term desynchronization was used for evasion methods
using sequence numbers. Some IDSs could be confused about what sequence
number it should expect, and the resulting inability to reconstruct
data effectively blinds it. This technique was known in 1998 and is now
partly obsolete. I have also seen more recent articles where the term
desynchronization was used for another method of IDS evasion. New
methods of evading IDS are constantly being thought up, and it's the
job of the vendors to try and keep up. Thus far most have managed this
very well.
Enumeration
Enumeration is when an attacker actively probes a
network to discover what hosts and services are present. As this action
is no longer passive it can be detected, though many networks reveal
this information with minimal active probing.
Evasion (see also Desynchronization)
Evasion is the process
of carrying out an attack without an IDS successfully detecting the
attack. The trick is making the IDS see one thing and the target see
another. One form of evasion is to set different time to live (TTL)
values for different packets. Therefore, the information passing the
IDS will seem harmless, however the TTL on the harmless bit is less
than that which is required to reach the target host. Once beyond the
IDS and nearing the target, the harmless piece is dropped leaving the
harmful remains. This example is greatly simplified. For an in depth
discussion on some of the principles of evasion discussed here, please
see Ptacek
and Newsham's seminal article, Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of
Service: Eluding Network Intrusion Detection.
False Negatives / Miss
A false negative occurs when an attack or an event is either not
detected by the IDS or is considered benign by the analyst. Ordinarily
the term false negative would only apply to the IDS not reporting an
event. However, I have seen this same problem at the analyst level. The
scenario is this: the analyst sees a certain signature day after day
and knows it to be benign so ignores it. However, one day the IDS
alerts on a genuine attack with the same signature. The analyst however
chooses to ignore it believing it to be benign, thus a False Negative.
Ordinarily this alert trigger would be removed through a false positive
reduction procedure (either the entire signature or tuning the
signature), though in my experience this tuning can create false
negatives. There is little difference between the IDS being tuned to
declare this event as benign and the analyst doing so on his own.
False Positives / False Alarm
An event that is picked up by the IDS and declared an attack but is
actually benign.
Fragmentation
If a packet is too big to pass on a network
segment, it will have to be broken up into smaller pieces (fragments.)
Fragmentation is mostly brought about by networks having differing
Maximum Transmission Units (MTU.) For instance, for token ring the MTU
is 4464 and for Ethernet it's 1500. Therefore, if a packet is moving
from token ring to Ethernet, it would have to be fragmented into
smaller packets that are then rebuilt at the target. Ordinarily, while
somewhat inefficient, fragmentation is perfectly normal. Hackers saw
fragmentation as a means to evade IDS, and there are also a few
associated DOS attacks that use this technique.
Heuristics
The term heuristics should be used where
artificial intelligence (AI) is used to detect intrusions. IDSs that
genuinely use heuristics have been allegedly almost ready for around a
decade. It is my understanding that they still aren't quite clever
enough and can be trained by an attacker to ignore malicious traffic.
Some IDSs use anomalies to detect intrusions, where the IDS has to
learn over time what can be considered normal. As this is fairly clever
some vendors will sell this as a heuristic IDS. I can think of at least
one IDS that does use an AI scripting language to apply analysis to the
incoming data. Rather than learning what is normal signatures can be
created that look for abnormal traffic these are sometimes referred to
as heuristic signatures, ie., too many repeated characters in a URL.
Honeynet Project
According to the The
Honeynet Project:
a honeynet, "is a tool for learning. It is a network of production
systems that is designed to be compromised. Once compromised, this
information is captured and analyzed [in order] to learn about the
blackhat community." A Honeynet is therefore an extremely valuable
resource, providing an inside view of a hack. The Honeynet Project
consists of a group of thirty accomplished security professionals who
have set up a series of honeypots to study the tactics, tools, motives
and behaviours of hackers by providing a seemingly vulnerable network
of honeypots and observing the hackers who intrude on those
'vulnerable' systems.
Honeypot
Honeypots are a highly flexible security tool with
differing applications for security. They don't fix a single problem
but instead they have multiple uses, such as intrusion prevention,
detection, or information gathering. Honeypots all share the same
concept, as a security resource that should not have any production or
authorized activity. This makes them very simple to use. There are two
general types of honeypots, production and research. Production
honeypots aka low interaction honeypots are easy to use, capture only
limited information, and used primarily by companies or corporations
for detecting interest in their assets. Research honeypots are complex
to deploy and maintain, capture extensive information, and used
primarily by research, military, or government organizations. Another
purpose is to delay attackers in their pursuit of legitimate targets,
causing the attacker to waste time on the honeypot, whilst the original
entry hole is secured, leaving the truly valuable assets alone. In some
countries law enforcement agencies cannot prosecute using evidence from
a honeypot. See also Honeynet.
Honeytokens
A honeytoken
is a seemingly valuable/interesting document or similar that may be
taken by an attacker, signatures are written for the IDS to track it's
movement.
Summary
The second and final article in this series will
discuss various types of IDS categories in detail, as well as other
important IDS terms such as Signatures and Anomalies.

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